Thursday, June 17, 2004
Washington, D.C.
NTSB Conference Center
CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN
PANEL I:
STAFF STATEMENT NO. 17: IMPROVISING A HOMELAND DEFENSE
PANEL II:
GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, USAF, CHARIMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMIRAL (SELECT) CHARLES JOSEPH LEIDIG, USN, COMMANDANT OF MIDSHIPMEN, UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
GENERAL RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF, COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND(NORAD) AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
MAJOR GENERAL LARRY ARNOLD, USAF (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES NORAD REGION (CONR)
PANEL III:
MONTE BELGER, FORMER ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
JEFF GRIFFITH, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
JOHN WHITE, FORMER FACILITY MANAGER, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS COMMAND CENTER, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
BENEDICT SLINEY, OPERATIONS MANAGER, NEW YORK TERMINAL RADAR APPROACH CONTROL, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Initially, when the first plane was reported on the news to have crashed into the first Trade Center tower, the National Military Command Center was primarily a means to notify senior leadership that, in fact, an event had occurred.
After the second aircraft impacted the second tower, the Command Center then became a focal point for coordinating information flow. And at that point I convened -- by the procedures that existed on 9/11, I convened a conference called a Significant Event Conference.
And what that does is that brings leadership and combatant commanders into the conference to start discussing what actions should be taken or might be taken. And so at that point I, as the senior watch officer, then control the conference that gets all these folks on the phone.
FAA tried to be included in that conference and we had difficulty throughout the morning getting them in the conference. That hampered information flow to some degree.
MR. LEHMAN: Why didn't somebody just pick up their cell phone and call them?
ADM. LEIDIG: Yes, sir, we did open a separate line to them. But the conference is on a special phone circuit and it's classified to be able to pass information, relay information between very senior leadership all the way over to the White House. And in some cases the president can be included in these conferences --
MR. LEHMAN: But how long was FAA out of connectivity to this conferencing?
ADM. LEIDIG: Sir, I couldn't tell you. I don't know how long. I know that they were intermittently in. Most of the time they were not in the conference.
MR. LEHMAN: They were not in. And do you think that interfered with NORAD learning about 93, which was a pretty critical failure of the day?
ADM. LEIDIG: I can't speak to that specific flight, sir, but I can say that it did hamper information flow because we were getting information in a more roundabout way from FAA. Sometimes it would come from a local commander to NORAD back to us, or sometimes it would come on an open line. We were trying to maintain just an open telephone line to the operations center.
MR. LEHMAN: Wouldn't it have been better to have FAA communicating directly with FAA and with NMCC monitoring if they could, but not being the focal point?
ADM. LEIDIG: I'm not sure I understand your question. Could you say it one more time, sir?
MR. LEHMAN: Well, if the commander of NORAD had picked up the phone and set up a line, secure or insecure, with the head of FAA, or whoever had the op-con at FAA, it seems to me that things would have worked a lot better than had everybody had to hook into this teleconference. Was it a teleconference or a voice conference?
ADM. LEIDIG: It's a voice conference, sir.
MR. LEHMAN: Voice conference.
ADM. LEIDIG: Yes, sir.
MR. LEHMAN: Voice conference. So, in drawing it up --
ADM. LEIDIG: I don't know if I can speak for NORAD, but I can say that the conference, as set up, includes a combatant commander and other entities. And so they're all on a conference. Whether it's controlled elsewhere or not, I don't know if that would have helped information flow. But if FAA had been in the same conference that was being directed by the National Military Command Center, the information flow would have went directly to NORAD because they're in that conference.
MR. LEHMAN: Do you think the insistence on having a secure line as opposed to an open line, which is what FAA's excuse is, was the main problem? And, if so, why was it necessary?
ADM. LEIDIG: I know some changes have been made in the Command Center. I apologize; I've been gone from the Joint Staff for over a year now and I'm not familiar with the upgrades. I understand on that day that there were some compatibility issues between their secure phone and ours in the Command Center that caused them to drop out of the conference. But I'm not aware of the technical aspects of it.
MR. LEHMAN: General Eberhart, did you find that the set-up that was quickly put together, going through the NMCC, a help or a hindrance, in retrospect?
GEN. EBERHART: Sir, in retrospect, I think it was a help, because you have to have all these different players with all these different interests and responsibilities and authorities on the conference at the same time.
Because of just what you said, today we have all sorts of alternate paths to the FAA at the tactical and the operational and the strategic levels. I don't think, had FAA been up at that time, that we would have gotten any different information, because I don't think that the sectors, the FAA regions, had up- channeled this to the headquarters. And that's who we're trying to when we talk to.
And remember, on Flight 93, they didn't know where 93 was. And so when you see the line on the chart that reflies 93, we postulate that based on the last radar contact and where it crashed, sadly. So they didn't have the radar track, so therefore they couldn't tell us where it was.
MR. LEHMAN: Captain, were you satisfied with the connectivity you had with the White House, with the vice president, and through him to the president, or directly, say, to Air Force One?
ADM. LEIDIG: Sir, we were connected to the White House and I was satisfied with the communications to the White House.
MR. LEHMAN: Do you have any personal lessons learned? You're no longer there, but you certainly went through one of the most frantic crises as to those arrangements.
ADM. LEIDIG: Sir, the most significant lesson -- and I think you've kind of zeroed in on it -- was the communications capabilities and the ability to bring leadership at the important organizations together to make a decision in a timely manner. We were hampered that day by communications. And any improvements in that area would be significant.
MR. LEHMAN: Yeah, I think also we all know that there are always communications glitches, and there have got to be work-arounds. I mean, the fact was that FAA Headquarters did know about 93 very early on, from 9:34 on. And if somebody had just picked up the phone to keep the connectivity open, it could have made a difference.
Thank you.
MR. KEAN: Commissioner Roemer.
MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain, just a brief follow-up to Commissioner Lehman's last question. He asked you, were you satisfied with your connectivity to the White House and Air Force One. You said you were satisfied with the White House. Were you satisfied with Air Force One? And I think it's been conveyed to you that in our interview with the president, the president said he was very frustrated and troubled with connections and connectivity that day.
ADM. LEIDIG: Sir, I can't speak to the connectivity with Air Force One. I was connected to the White House. And my understanding is Air Force One was in contact with the White House Situation Room. I was not in contact with --
MR. ROEMER: So you have no knowledge of that.
ADM. LEIDIG: No, sir.
MR. LEHMAN: Is there no NMCC protocol to connect directly with Air Force One?
ADM. LEIDIG: Yes, sir, there is a capability to do that. On that day we were connected with the White House.
MR. ROEMER: Why weren't you using that other capability?
ADM. LEIDIG: I don't recall, sir.
MR. ROEMER: General Eberhart, a question about our training posture on the day of 9/11. On page five of our Staff Statement, the FAA says at 8:38 in the morning, "Hi, Boston Center, TMU, we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York and we need you guys to -- we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there. Help us out." NEADS says, "Is this real world or an exercise?"
My question is, you were postured for an exercise against the former Soviet Union. Did that help or hurt? Did that help in terms of were more people prepared? Did you have more people ready? Were more fighters fueled with more fuel? Or did this hurt in terms of people thinking, "No, there's no possibility that this is real world; we're engaged in an exercise," and delay things? Or did it have both impacts?
GEN. EBERHART: Sir, my belief is that it helped because of the manning, because of the focus, because the crews -- they have to be airborne in 15 minutes. And that morning, because of the exercise, they were airborne in six or eight minutes. And so I believe that focus helped.
The situation that you're referring to, I think, at most cost us 30 seconds -- 30 seconds.
MR. ROEMER: That's what we have recorded. I just wondered if there was more of that down the line.
GEN. EBERHART: No, it became painfully clear, Commissioner, that this was not an exercise.
MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. KEAN: Our last questioner for this panel will be Commissioner Ben-Veniste.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: Yes. I'd like to first relay information again from our staff report and so that there is clarity in the record. It is our information that FAA tracked Flight 93 from the moment it was hijacked. The problem was that it did not communicate the hijack information to NORAD so that NORAD was in position, with unarmed planes, over Washington and the Capitol at some point.
MR. ARNOLD: Armed.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: First unarmed and then armed.
MR. ARNOLD: First armed -- first armed.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: And then the Andrews planes were unarmed.
MR. ARNOLD: Thirty minutes later.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: Okay. So the point is that, whether or not -- well, because the shoot-down order had not been communicated, whether or not those planes could have been -- that plane could have been intercepted and shot down was a matter of speculation within our staff report.
So with agreement on that --
MR. ARNOLD: Sir, I believe there's a time there where FAA lost radar contact with this airplane. And that's what I believe I remember, so we'll have to check the record.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: The information we have is they lost it briefly around Pittsburgh and they picked it back up again. So let me move to another question to try --
MR. ARNOLD: This one question has come up repeatedly, and I think it needs to be put in proper perspective. I'm not trying to defend Colonel Marr, but I think you need to understand that these aircraft that were airborne over Washington D.C. at that particular time were not, as we call it, paired. They were not directed at an aircraft at that particular time.
And the way we train with peacetime rules of engagement, the way we train is we pass along the authorities when they're required. So we'd require them to go out and intercept that airplane, not to shoot that airplane down but to try to divert that aircraft away from Washington D.C. And then, with the authorities that we had or would have had from the president at that particular time, when the time was pertinent, we would have said, "You're cleared to fire."
And that is the way we train. That's what the pilots would have expected. And so I don't find anything wrong with what Colonel Marr did. In fact, I think what General Eberhart stated was we were more concerned about shooting down an airplane. We had a lot of airplanes flying at that particular time.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: I would not in any way, shape or form seek to minimize the concern about shooting down an unarmed plane that posed no threat to the Capitol of the United States. My only point there was to clarify the record with respect to the time at which FAA had the plane, knowing it was hijacked.
The issue which we have repeatedly come back to is the disconnect between the fact that this plane was hijacked, that FAA knew it but did not communicate that information to NORAD. That problem was exacerbated by the fact that in our prior hearings and through prior public statements, there was a suggestion that NORAD was positioned in a knowing way with respect to both Flight 77 and 93.
Now, I want to turn to one other area where there has been some misconception. And perhaps I can start with Admiral Leidig. In this regard, you were a participant on the Air Threat Conference Call.
ADM. LEIDIG: Yes, sir.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: And do you recall at some point -- we have it at 10:37 -- that the vice president of the United States reported on that call that there was an anonymous threat against Air Force One, using the then-code name Angel, that it was to be the next target? Do you recall that, sir?
ADM. LEIDIG: Sir, I think that occurred right after I was relieved on the watch by General Winfield. Right after we resolved what was going on with United 93, around that time General Winfield took over. So I'm familiar because I've looked at the transcript, but I wasn't on the conference at that time.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: Now, let me ask General Eberhart and General Arnold whether that information was communicated to you in any real- time basis.
GEN. EBERHART: No, sir, not to me.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: The information, according to the staff, that that was another phantom report, that there was no anonymous call, there was no use of the code name Angel for Air Force One or a statement that Air Force One was to be next, and yet that mythology was perpetuated for some weeks, if not months, thereafter. And as we know, those things, it's hard for them to go away.
So to the best of your knowledge here, do you have any information which would suggest that there was a threat received on September 11th against Air Force One?
GEN. EBERHART: I was not aware of it that day nor this day, Mr. Commissioner.
MR. ARNOLD: Nor was I.
MR. BEN-VENISTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. KEAN: That concludes our questions for this panel. I want to thank you all very much for your service and for taking your time to be with us today.
MR. KEAN: The Commission now welcomes our second panel of the day which will focus on the Federal Aviation Administration's response to 9/11. Joining us Mr. Monte Belger, Former Acting Deputy Administrator of the FAA; Mr. Jeff Griffith, Former Deputy Director of Air Traffic Control for the FAA; Mr. John White, Former Facility Manager of the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia; and Mr. Benedict Sliney, the Former Operations Manager of the same Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, and the current Operations Manager of the FAA's New York Terminal Radar Approach Control.
Will you please raise your right hands while I place you under oath. Do you swear or affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
(Panel answers affirmatively.)
MR. KEAN: Thank you. All written statements are going to be entered into the record in full. Mr. Belger, you can start by summarizing your remarks.
MR. BELGER: Yes, sir, very briefly, if I could. And I will be very brief.
You've introduced the four of us, and we will do our best to try to put in perspective our thoughts about the FAA's performance on 9/11. As you said, September 11, I was the Acting Deputy Administrator of the FAA. I was on duty that day in my office, and was obviously very much involved on that day.
Let me make just a couple remarks, if I could, kind of tailored to this morning's discussion. Before September 11, 2001, the FAA and the FBI were the key federal agencies in the management of historical hijackings in the United States. Procedures, protocols, the communication links were in place to manage a more traditional hijacking type of scenario. Roles and responsibilities were pretty much defined by law and by memorandums of agreement between FAA, the FBI, and the Department of Defense.
At that time, FAA's primary communication channel with the military was through the National Military Command Center, and we've heard that discussed this morning, and I think that's been validated that that is, and was, at that time, our primary communication point. And the National Military Command Center in a hijack scenario had the responsibility to coordinate DOD's response to requests from the FAA or the FBI. The FAA at that time did not have direct dedicated communication links with NORAD. The NMCC was the coordination authority between the FAA and DOD organizations.
I think it's important in the discussions about what information FAA passed to NORAD that it's important to understand that the NMCC was the primary communications point in the military with the FAA in terms of the hijack net in the FAA Headquarters.
On the morning of 9/11, it became clear that the historical procedures, the protocols, and the communication links were not adequate. The FAA and other agencies were reacting to a scenario that had not been practiced or modeled. Decision-makers, including myself, were reacting quickly and, in my opinion professionally, but in an untested environment. I think the staff's description of improvisation is accurate, and I absolutely take no exception to that. We were, in my view, in a reaction mode in an environment in which we had not been in before.
Throughout the morning, our FAA focus, in my belief, was on our primary traffic mission, which was the safe operation of the air traffic control system. FAA facilities in New York, Boston, and the Air Traffic Control Command Center, stopped all arrivals and departures in certain regions and at various airports. At 9:45 a.m., when the order was given to land all aircraft immediately at the closest airport, over 4,500 aircraft were in the system.
Our focus at that time was to safely land those hundreds of thousands of passengers. By 12:16, for the first time in the history of the FAA, the U.S. air space was empty of all aircraft except for military and essential emergency flights. Over 4,500 aircraft, and hundreds of thousands of passengers were safely landed under unique and highly stressful conditions. Roughly one flight every two seconds under those stressful conditions landed throughout the country. FAA controllers, supervisors, pilots, crews, dispatchers, and the automation equipment they used all performed flawlessly.
And when we knew in the FAA Headquarters that all the flights were safely on the ground, our attention then turned later that early afternoon to the process of reopening the air space at some future time. There were enormous decisions and processes that we needed to go through to make sure the aircraft were safe, that the airports were safe. The airports had to recertify their security status and, of course, the airlines had enormous logistical challenges to get back into a schedule operation.
In terms of lessons learned, the most significant improvement in my opinion made after September 11th were establishing direct communication links between FAA facilities and NORAD, direct dedicated communication links, and establishing a 24-hour continuous communication link between the FAA, DOT, and other federal agencies. And you've heard that referenced to earlier this morning.
In my written statement, I listed numerous other improvements made by the FAA and the Department of Transportation subsequent to September 11. I won't go through all those now in the interest of time. I do want to, as a follow up to I guess the first question that was asked by Commissioner Lehman, one thought that I believe the Commission really ought to think about in terms of recommendations for the future, as I said in the very beginning, since 9/11, the procedures, and the protocol, and the communication, and the training, awareness have changed since 9/11. I think the extensive steps that have been taken by the FAA to better integrate the domestic air traffic control system with the air defense system of the United States will ensure a quicker, more reliable response capability.
But I'm not as certain that the decision-making procedures are well established between the FAA, the DOD, the FBI and now the new player in the game, the Transportation Security Administration. And let me, if I could, very briefly just explain that concern which, quite frankly, I hope is not real, but I must tell you I think it is something you should focus on. Prior to 9/11, the procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft, as I said, were in place and pretty well tested. The FAA and the FBI were the primary agencies. But, in today's world, these procedures have obviously changed. When TSA was created, it took over decision authority that was previously the responsibility of the FAA Administrator. DOD clearly has a more dominant role in today's world, and the FAA Air Traffic organization has much more responsibility. And I believe, I would suggest that your Commission strongly look at the suggestion to encourage those agencies to test the procedures, to make sure that the protocols in the agreements are consistent with existing law, so that should, God forbid, we have another incident, there's absolutely no hesitation in terms of who is in charge, because the world is different today than it was on September 11th.
Thank you very much, and we'll do our best to answer your questions.
MR. KEAN: Thank you.
Any other members have any statements they would like to make before we start the questioning?
All right then. The questioning will start with Commissioner Gorelick.
MS. GORELICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would note, given the panel that we've just had, it's my observation that the government of the United States left the job of defending the American people from the scenario that played out on September 11th to the FAA, which is an unfair burden to have placed on an agency whose job description is almost entirely not the situation it faced. And so, I want to thank the men and women of the FAA for the hard work that they did in excruciating circumstances. Certainly there were flaws, and we will explore them, but I am quite uncomfortable if we leave the impression that all of this would have been fine if you all had just done your job, because I personally don't believe that. I think there is plenty of fault to go around, if that's what we're doing, and I hope that's not what we're doing.
One of the ways that the government might have been better positioned as a whole, and the FAA better positioned in particular, would be if you had gotten some sense at a very high level of the threat. And I want to review that with Mr. Belger. During the summer of 2001 you've told us that you had no knowledge of the heightened threat, I think that was a quote. You said that the threat assessments that the FAA got were not reflective of an unusual or inordinate anxiety level. Am I correct in both of those, Mr. Belger?
MR. BELGER: That's correct.
MS. GORELICK: And you got no notice of anything of the sort that was in the August 6th presidential daily briefs, is that correct?
MR. BELGER: That's correct.
MS. GORELICK: Now, General Canavan is telling us that he was called to a meeting at the White House in the beginning of July, a meeting with the counterterrorist security group at which threat information was shared, and the FAA undertook then to put out -- to alert, to make some alerts. We've gone back and looked at those alerts. Are you aware that the FAA sent out nothing until July 24th? Have you gone back and looked at what the FAA actually did?
MR. BELGER: I have looked at all of the information circulars that were put out, actually, that summer and the previous summer.
MS. GORELICK: After General Canavan is called to the White House, just to cut through it, there were no additional security directives of any relevance, and the security directives, am I correct, are the things that would have allowed you to raise the level of security alert, and change the actual operational and security baseline, is that correct?
MR. BELGER: That's correct, there were two types of information that was generally given to the industry. One was called a circular, which was just information, and secondly, as you are correct, a directive, which would have directed the airlines and the airports to do something different.
MS. GORELICK: And no such direction ever took place?
MR. BELGER: That's correct.
MS. GORELICK: And then there were information circulars that went out at various times, but they did not really put anyone on alert to anything remotely like the scenario that we had, and even then were full of caveats saying things like, we don't have credible information regarding any plans attacking U.S. civilian aviation, is that right?
MR. BELGER: That's correct.
MS. GORELICK: So as a practical matter, nothing that emanated from the FAA would have alerted people at any position of responsibility, whether it's at an airline check in counter, or a screener, or an airline in general, to do something that meaningfully might have stopped this plot, is that right?
MR. BELGER: That is correct, if I could just add to that very briefly. You're right. We did not -- the FAA did not put out any directives that summer requiring the airlines or the airports to do anything, other than what was at that time the ordinary. But, I must add to that answer that the airlines and the airports were already at a very heightened level in terms of the security procedures that were in place.
MS. GORELICK: But, there were additional levels in your toolbox that were not exercised that were not exercised, is that correct?
MR. BELGER: That is correct.
MS. GORELICK: Now I'm going to ask you a hypothetical question, and you can answer it any way you wish, but if you, Monty Belger, or your boss Jane Garvey, or her boss, Secretary Mineta, had been called to the White House and alerted to what we now know were the kinds of frightening intelligence coming out in the so-called summer of threat, do you think you might have taken a different set of steps, might you have changed the actual security baseline that the airlines were holding themselves to at that point in time?
MR. BELGER: In the context of a hypothetical question, I'll answer it. I don't know exactly what General Canavan was told, or heard at that meeting, but the FAA's history is pretty clear that we were never reluctant to put out security directives if there was information upon which we could base those directives. So my answer to your question is, if I had known, if administrator Garvey had known, if the folks in the Secretary's office had known of any potential threat in which we could have put some procedures in place to alleviate, we would have done that.
MS. GORELICK: Now, we know that we in the federal government did not have specifics, so-called actionable intelligence in that so and so is going to hijack a plane on such and such a day, or even that what we were hearing about was something that was related to a domestic hijacking. But, the government as a whole, and certainly our intelligence community was, to use the phrase, running around with their hair on fire. People were very anxious. And I guess what I'm asking is, given that level of anxiety, given the chatter, given what I think Dr. Rice described the government as being at battle stations. My question to you is, were you at battle stations, and if, given the heightened threat, but the lack of specificity, would you have done something different, if you personally had been alerted, or your boss, or your boss' boss had been alerted to this heightened level of threat?
MR. BELGER: Well, there are two parts to that question, which I'll answer separately. First of all, as I said to the staff, during that summer period, I saw no intelligence, nor did our security folks tell me anything that would lead us to direct the airlines and the airports to do anything other than what they were doing. So if you use that phrase, heightened level of security, I don't think the FAA saw the need to do that. Secondly, though, if, as I said earlier, if we had any information that there was a potential threat that we could react to, we would have.
MS. GORELICK: Well, that's almost tautological, if you knew of a threat you would have reacted to it. You're saying that the -- I don't want to put words in your mouth, but you're saying that had you personally known of the general heightened level of threat, you would or would not have taken additional steps to that which were taken?
MR. BELGER: Again, I think that's a little bit hypothetical, so I'm not sure just what that heightened level of threat information is that people were talking about. What I will say very clearly is, if information had been given to me, or the administrator, I have no doubt about that, that was directly related to aviation security, and there was something we could have done to put in new procedures, different procedures to react to that, we would have, without hesitation.
MS. GORELICK: I'm going to -- let me just follow that up. We know that half of the hijackers were stopped, because they came up in screening on CAPS. Yet, the only thing that was done related to their checked bags. If we were -- I might imagine that in a very heightened state of alert you would say, well, the consequence of being stopped is that you actually are screened, your hand bag is screened, for example. Now, if you had thought -- I mean, you have said to us you didn't know anything about this if you or your boss, or your boss' boss had known about the heightened level of threat, would you have considered directing the airlines to have a different set of procedures, a heightened level of procedures?
MR. BELGER: We would have considered it, and in fact, we did implement that after 9/11.
MS. GORELICK: Thank you.
My colleague, Senator Gorton, will have some additional questions. We've kind of divided up the territory here on the day of 9/11. But, I'm particularly interested in one thing. At 9:16 the tapes reveal that a manager from the Boston center asked the command center to issue a -- on the day of 9/11, issue a nationwide cockpit security alert, which Boston had done. Which meant, as I understand it, you told everybody, lock your cockpit doors, or beware of someone trying to enter the cockpit. But, such an alert was not issued, and a quarter of an hour later the cockpit in United 93 was breached. Can you explain that decision. Can any of you explain that decision?
MR. BELGER: Mr. White was the senior person at the command center, he might be best able to do that.
MR. WHITE: I wasn't aware of that request.
MS. GORELICK: Your mike.
MR. WHITE: I wasn't aware of that request, this is the first time I've heard of it, today. I wasn't in a position that day to have heard that request. I have always been under the assumption that we did issue a verbal warning to the air carriers about cockpit security. I don't know if we even made a decision, or if there was ever a determination made why we shouldn't send an advisory out. I'm not aware.
MS. GORELICK: All right. We will ask -- does anyone else on this panel have any relevant information on that? We'll follow up privately, then, thank you on that.
The protocol, as I understand it, for hijackings, was to -- on the day of 9/11, was to allow the hijacking to go forward, essentially not to resist, and to let it go forward, and deal with the consequences once the plane landed, on the assumption that that's what the hijackers were going to do. And it struck me that -- what struck a lot of people that that protocol did not reflect the kind of intelligence we have about what al Qaeda and other terrorists might be planning. Was there any effort made on the part of the leadership of the FAA to look at that protocol and test it against the kind of intelligence that you were getting about the threats to our aviation system?
MR. BELGER: The short answer is no. You are right that prior to 9/11 the protocol was get the airplane on the ground and start a negotiation with the hijacker -- make sure the airplane is on the ground safely and start a negotiation process. That worked throughout the years prior to 9/11.
I'm not aware of any particular scenarios or exercise that we went through to test that protocol against the type of intelligence that you talked about which, quite frankly as I said before, wasn't getting to the FAA.
MS. GORELICK: So, one can note that that protocol was changed by the passengers and the crew of United 93. They threw that protocol out the window in real time.
MR. BELGER: Yes.
MS. GORELICK: Our Staff Statement reflects a very long, 39- minute gap in between when the FAA became aware of the United 93 as a hijacking and when the military was notified at 10:07, which was of course after they impact into the Pentagon. And I want to give you all an opportunity to explain why that occurred -- I'm sorry, not impacted the Pentagon --
MR. BELGER: Well --
MS. GORELICK: -- impact into the ground in Pennsylvania.
MR. BELGER: Right. The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC. That's still frustrating for me to understand how that -- I know how it's supposed to work, but I have to tell you it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day. It is clear I think in the record that at 9:20 the FAA operations center did call the National Military Command Center and add them into the hijacking net. The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time. That's the purpose of the hijack net. There are other nets off of that, which some are classified and some are real technical command type of discussions. But the fundamental primary source of information between the FAA, DOD, FBI, Secret Service, and which every other agencies -- the airlines would probably be on that net -- is the FAA hijack net. That was activated with the NMCC at 9:20. It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time.
MS. GORELICK: Did you do anything to ensure that your assumption, a costly one, was correct?
MR. BELGER: No. I did as I was -- I was real busy that morning. I did not ask specifically is the NMCC on. And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.
MS. GORELICK: At some point, however, in the course of that call you became aware that the military was not involved in any meaningful way. Is that correct? We heard some rather colorful language came from your mouth at that point.
MR. BELGER: I don't doubt that. Yeah, I mean later in the morning, as I had time to not just react to everything and think, I believe I did ask, you know, Are they on? -- and make sure.
MS. GORELICK: And when you found out that they weren't?
MR. BELGER: No, I wasn't very happy.
MS. GORELICK: I guess I'll leave this to my colleague, Senator Gorton.
MR. KEAN: Senator Gorton?
MR. GORTON: Mr. Belger, I want to go back to one of Commissioner Gorelick's subjects. You very clearly describe the protocol with respect to hijacking that was in effect on 9/11. But we have a rather troubling note from the staff that I will share with you and ask you to comment on. Most managers at FAA headquarters have little or no recollection of the protocols in place on 9/11 with respect to their roles and responsibilities on a hijacking. With the exception of a few individuals from the Security Division, there appear to be little or no training at FAA headquarters or Command Center regarding hijacking procedures. Indeed, when asked to identify who the hijack coordinator was on 9/11, it was difficult to find two witnesses who identified the same individual. At the Command Center, no one could remember any training or exercises regarding the role that the center would play in a hijacking. Is that a fair statement?
MR. BELGER: Well, from my perspective there is no doubt in my mind that the FAA security organization knew what to do. There is no doubt in my mind that the air traffic organization knew what to do. They are the two key players in that type of scenario. I think Mr. Griffith was the senior air traffic person in the headquarters. He probably has more direct knowledge of what the air traffic people knew than I did, and maybe he could answer that.
MR. GORTON: Fine.
MR. GRIFFITH: Thank you. As Mr. Belger stated, from my point of view I'm absolutely sure that our field managers know -- knew on 9/11 what to do in the event of a hijacking. The procedures are very cleared. The procedures are trained as a matter of refresher training in our operational facilities every year, and it surprises me to hear that someone would think that our field managers would not know what to do in the event of a hijacking. There are protocols, there are check lists, there are folders that are kept in operational positions where people have responsibility for reporting. And through the years -- not only for hijackings, but aircraft accidents and other incidents -- reporting is a very high priority. So it surprises me that people would think our managers didn't know how to report.
MR. GORTON:Well, Mr. Sliney, you were at the Command Center. As a matter of fact, you were in your job -- it was your first day on this particular job. In your statement, "At the Command Center no one could remember any training or exercises regarding the role the Command Center would play in a hijacking" -- correct?
MR. SLINEY: I don't believe it's correct, no. I believe that the FAA or the Command Center personnel understood that the protocol was in place that the center that reported the hijacking would notify the military. And I believe we have already outlined -- or Mr. Belger has already outlined that the usual practices of handling hijacks -- I go back to 1964, where I began my air traffic career, and they have always followed the same protocol. So I think that Command Center personnel were at least in tune to that aspect of the protocol. Now, whether they're aware of a specific protocol that involved NMCC, that I do not know. I could say I did not know.
MR. GORTON: Mr. Belger, how promptly after 9/11 was the hijacking protocol revised?
MR. BELGER: The next morning I asked for several things to be done. One was a complete review of the performance of our operations center, and then I asked a senior air traffic person from the field to come in and help me with that process in the air traffic organization. That process began immediately.
The things that we did most quickly were to put in direct communication capability -- at that time we didn't have the sophisticated capability we have today -- but direct communication capability between our field centers and NORAD, with the instructions to call NORAD immediately, as Mr. Sliney said. We put in the 24-hour communication net, which is still operational today, where are the federal agencies are hearing real-time what's happening in the air traffic control system. We put out some awareness training for the controllers to make them a little better aware of the slightest deviation of an aircraft from their flight plan, the slightest communication problem, the slightest transponder problem which in the past might have been handled differently. Those were now and as of the next day were reported immediately to NORAD. Those things were done immediately.
MR. GORTON: I'd like to go beyond that. Every element of your answer relates to how people within FAA and the controllers were to respond. But the previous protocol said to the airlines, to the pilots and to the crews, "Cooperate, get the plane down."
MR. BELGER: Yes.
MR. GORTON: How quickly was any change, if any change indeed was made? How quickly was any change of plan made in that respect?
MR. BELGER: We started talking about that immediately. Secretary Mineta put together a couple of rapid-response teams. One of their recommendations I think dealt with specifically what you're referring to, the training for flight crews. And those procedures were changed. I can't tell you exactly how long that took, but it was -- the process was put in place.
MR. GORTON: Is that protocol -- are those instructions to the airlines a matter of public knowledge now, or is this something that is simply regulated between FAA, TSA and the airlines themselves?
MR. BELGER: I don't know how public that is, to be honest with you. I've been gone for almost two years, and I honestly don't know.
MR. GORTON: Okay. Mr. Sliney, you're the only one that's still there. This isn't your direct responsibility, but do you know the answer to that question?
MR. SLINEY: I do not.
MR. GORTON: Okay. Let me go on to you, Mr. Sliney, with a few questions. When you on your first day on the job made two decisions on 9/11, that at one level at least weren't yours to make, did you not? First, that no one should take off; and, second, we should take all civilian aircraft out of the air. Is that not correct?
MR. SLINEY: That is correct.
MR. GORTON: And would you describe how you came to that decision and why you felt it imperative enough to make that decision without going through the usual command structure?
MR. SLINEY: I believed I had the authority to do those things on that day. I was charged with the safe and efficient operation of the national airspace system. The ground stop -- the national ground stop was, one, a matter of scope, not of unfamiliarity with the remedy, but a matter of scope. And had -- since we had already put in place ground stops that covered Boston, New York, and essentially the East Coast, and those -- we still had more reports of aircraft whose course or altitude or other aspects of their flight made them suspicious in light of the crashes. The national ground stop was just a natural extension of the smaller scope ground stops.
As to the order to land, that was the product of the men and women in the Command Center who gave me advice on that day, the supervisors and the specialists. We were searching for something more to do, and that was made and decided on, and the impetus for that of course was the crash into the Pentagon when we gave that order.
MR. GORTON: Was your career in the FAA either enhanced or hurt in any way by making those decisions as promptly as you did?
MR. SLINEY: I would say in neither respect, sir.
MR. GORTON: On 9/11, the Command Center effectively was the nerve center for information on suspicious aircraft. Yet as I understand it the Command Center had no defined role with respect to obtaining military assistance, fighter assistance. Is that correct? And, if so, why weren't those authorities combined?
MR. SLINEY: Available to us at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.
The normal protocols for the events that were transpiring then -- that is to say hijacked aircraft, which requires a notification to NORAD -- those, at least I was given to understand, were made promptly -- the notifications on each hijack. The --
MR. GORTON: You understood that they were made promptly?
MR. SLINEY: That's correct.
MR. GORTON: It wasn't you -- it wasn't your responsibility to do so?
MR. SLINEY: That is correct. I believe I am correct in stating that that responsibility devolves upon the air route traffic control center in whose jurisdiction that hijack occurs. I was given to understand that all such notifications were made. I had no reason to believe they were not.
The -- I'm getting away from your question, though. You ask me if we had a procedure in place to deal with such an event -- is that what you're asking?
MR. GORTON: At the Command Center.
MR. SLINEY: With -- well, I just want to be clear on this aspect of it. Dealing with aircraft that would be hijacked and used as weapons?
MR. GORTON: No.
MR. SLINEY: No. Dealing with hijacked --
MR. GORTON: Dealing with direct notification to the military or request for assistance from the military.
MR. SLINEY: In direct response to your question was FAA headquarters primarily through the security organization to request assistance from the military. We had no process in place where a Command Center would make such a request for a military assistance. I believe the military was involved, and you know I suppose in hindsight it's too simplistic to say that they all look alike to me. If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military.
MR. GORTON: By the Command Center?
MR. SLINEY: Correct.
MR. BELGER: Senator, can I just respond?
MR. GORTON: Yes, you certainly can.
MR. BELGER: Just in direct response to your question, the protocol on that day -- the official protocol on that day was for the FAA headquarters, primarily through the hijack coordinator, who is a senior person in the security organization, to request assistance from the NMCC if there was a need for DOD assistance. I mean, that was the formal protocol that day.
MR. GORTON: It wasn't the formal protocol for Mr. Sliney to have gotten headquarters permission before he put in these ground stops?
MR. BELGER: I don't agree with that personally. I think -- I agree with Mr. Sliney completely. I think they had the authority to make that decision. I think they made the right call.
MR. GORTON: No question about that.
MR. BELGER: They make those -- not into scope obviously -- but they make ground-stop type decisions on a daily basis. And I think the folks there, the folks in Boston, the folks in the facilities -- and frankly at the same time that the people in the Department of Transportation were coming to that same conclusion, at the same time they all made the right decision.
MR. GORTON: So no one criticized Mr. Sliney for having made it without getting permission from headquarters?
MR. BELGER: I never criticized him. Absolutely not. To the contrary.
MR. GORTON: That's not quite the answer to my question. Do you know whether anyone else did?
MR. BELGER: I don't know.
MR. GORTON: Mr. Sliney?
MR. SLINEY: I only -- I was not criticized directly by anyone for making that decision at all. I say that unequivocally. I could say I heard anecdotal information that someone was surprised that we had made that decision, but that was the extent of it. No one has criticized me directly for doing either of those -- making either of those decisions.
MR. GORTON: Well, that's probably as much as we are going to get out of you on that one, so we'll let it go.
Mr. Sliney, I am told that your -- what is your present assignment?
MR. SLINEY: Presently I'm an operations manager at the New York terminal radar approach control. It's involved with the actual operation of the airports in the New York area. There's 20-odd airports, the major ones included.
MR. GORTON: So you're up in New York now?
MR. SLINEY: Correct.
MR. GORTON: I'm told that very recently, within the last two or three weeks, there was some kind of incident or occurrence there which would have involved a notice to the military. I don't really know any more about it than that, but I hope I've given you enough to ask you to describe what that incident was.
MR. SLINEY: The -- I think the incident highlights the need to develop the lines of communication between the operational elements and the military or the people who are going to make the decisions whether or not to scramble.
MR. GORTON: That's -- after almost three years, that's a pretty profound statement. So would you go -- proceed?
MR. SLINEY: On the day in question there was a -- and, by the way, you now have 16,000 pairs of eyes and ears -- the air traffic controller in this country that are extremely alert, in my view, to anything that is unusual in terms of course deviation, or any unusual flight at all is reported to the next level of authority. In this case I'm the second level of authority in the operation of the terminal radar approach control. And frequently the young men and women there report to me events that they deem to be suspicious, based on the events of 9/11, of course. And in this particular incident an aircraft was -- an unidentified aircraft at 16,000 feet approaching New York City from the northwest at a pretty moderate ground speed of 300 knots, when no one was working, and we did not know who the aircraft was. We reported immediately to FAA -- excuse me, the Air Route Traffic Control Center, who reported immediately to NORAD. NORAD later in the episode, within a few minutes, asked me if I were requesting a military intervention. And I indicated to NORAD that I'm advising you of the facts of this particular incident -- I'm not requesting anything. I wasn't sure I even had the authority to request such a thing. And when the lady persisted at NORAD, I asked her if I could call her back, and I went to the domestic event net, which is available to all facilities, and most of the major facilities are on it, and I queried NORAD and the FAA headquarters as to whether or not I had such authority to ask for intervention by the military or scramble on this particular aircraft. And they did agree that I had such authority, after discussion on the virtues of collaboration. However, I indicated further, when I agreed that we should collaborate in such decisions, but if time did not permit it, did I have that authority. I persisted in that, and they said that I did. I did not know that prior to that moment in time.
MR. GORTON: Now, how long while that aircraft was going at 300 knots did this set of conversations take?
MR. SLINEY: This took several minutes, and it was -- at the point in which I finally received the answer, the aircraft was southeast of Manhattan and traveling east along the coastline. It turns out, through the remarkable radar that TSA possesses -- or the Customs people, excuse me, they have the best radar -- they indicated that they tracked that backwards to its point of departure, and we identified the aircraft as a photo mission of some civilian nature that was not coordinated with us. But definitely an aircraft that was suspicious.
But the point of the whole thing was that I don't believe the lines of communication are as clear as they should be devolving from the decision-making process down to the operational level where you have those 15--or 16,000 sets of eyes and ears that are fine attuned to the events that occurred on 9/11.
MR. GORTON: It would be hard to disagree with you, Mr. Sliney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. KEAN: Thank you, Senator. I just had one question, I guess, on the transponder. As I understand it, and forgive me, because I don't know much technologically about anything, but the transponder can get turned off. At that point, at least temporarily, the aircraft disappears and you have to put it back to that -- just follow me and tell me if I'm right -- then you have to find it again on radar, but there are stretches of the country where radar doesn't cover, as there was with one of these flights, and the aircraft then totally disappears for a while. Is that correct?
MR. SLINEY: Not to my understanding, and particularly not in the Northeast, where radar coverage is extensive. But I believe the altitude of the aircraft would affect our ability to track the primary or radar target. The transponder enhances that. If the transponder is on, you can pretty much follow the target anywhere. But at low altitudes, you would have the terrain and other anomalies of the radar that would prevent you from tracking the aircraft at a low altitude.
MR. KEAN: Well, I'm asking -- one of these - I'm asking this question is one of the aircraft did disappear, and for a period of time --
MR. SLINEY: Disappeared, yes. As I understood --
MR. KEAN: Because of the altitude, I guess, because it was flying high, and it was flying in an area where the radar coverage was not the same as it is in the Northeast?
MR. SLINEY: I would be speculating on who had it in radar contact. There are radars that would have seen the target regardless. Would they have known what to be looking for, I do not know. Did Boston Center lose radar control of the aircraft, or lose the target? They could have. Their altitude -- their altitude structure is much higher than the terminal radar approach controls, which probably could have seen it, but would not have had the electronic representation of the data associated with that target at those terminal radar approach controls as the center would have.
MR. KEAN: Well, I'm asking the question -- it did disappear --
MR. SLINEY: I can talk forever.
MR. KEAN: -- for a period of time? The -- and -- but my main question, I guess, is if -- if the hijacker or somebody -- there's no reason for anybody who's a pilot ever to turn off the transponder. It should be on at all times while the plane is in the air.
MR. SLINEY: That's correct.
MR. KEAN: Why, then, is the transponder put inside the cockpit, in a place where a hijacker can walk in and simply turn it off, and then plane then, at least temporarily, disappears, maybe if it's high and out of radar control it disappears for a lot longer? Would it be -- would it be not sensible to build the transponder in another part of the plane, or outside the plane, or someplace where you wouldn't turn it off until it got down and the pilot or people in the cockpit couldn't do it?
MR. SLINEY: I would have to agree with you. It doesn't -- certainly in hindsight, the ability of the hijackers to shut off the transponder was one factor. I think the biggest factor, at least the biggest anomaly in my mind on that day was I had never experienced a situation where a hijacker could fly the plane.
MR. KEAN: Okay.
MR. BELGER: Commissioner?
MR. KEAN: Yes?
MR. BELGER: If I could, the FAA did look at regulations to require transponders to be equipped such that they could not be turned off in flight. I don't know the status of that because it occurred -- I think the finality occurred after I left, but the FAA did start a rulemaking process to require that.
MR. KEAN: But best as you know, nothing has been done as yet?
MR. BELGER: Well, I just -- I don't know one way or the other. Yeah, I just -- I don't know.
MR. KEAN: Thank you very much. Congressman Roemer.
MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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